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THE ETHICS OF PLOTINUS1 
Kieran McGroarty 
I Plotinus and Porphyry's Life 
The theme of this paper is, what I believe to be, the inconsistency in the life 
lived by Plotinus and the ethical teaching of the Enneads. This paper will 
do little more than set out the problem. We know quite a bit about the life 
Plotinus lived because of a biography written by his most famou s pupil, 
Porphyry. We have some fragments from another biogra~hy by Eunapius 
and other bits and pieces. But Porphyry is the chief source. We are lucky to 
have anything at all when we consider the opening lines of Porphyry's 
biography: 
Plotinus, the philosopher of our times, seemed ashamed of being 
in the body. As a result of this state of mind he could never bear 
to talk about his race or his parents or his native country (Vita 
Plotini 1.1-2). 
This is the man who refused to sit for a portrait artist or sculptor because he 
saw little point in producing an image of what was only an image anyway 
(VP 1.7-9). They were reduced to passing off a portrait arti st as a student in 
order to obtain a portrait of the great man. So to be Plotinus' biographer 
was, one imagines, no easy task. We speculate that Plotinus was born in 
Lycopolis (modern Assuit), on the banks of the Nile in Upper Egypt in A.D. 
205.
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We get his place of birth from Eunapius4 not Porphyry. Plotinus's 
name is certainly Roman but he was most probably a Greek or at least from 
a Helleni zed Egyptian family . His language was certainly Greek. 
1 
This is the text of a paper presented as the fi rst lecture in the Gerard Watson Memorial 
Series. It was written for an undergrad uate audience who knew next to nothing about 
Plotinus. T he text has been altered sli ghtly. but, by and large, it reads as it was delivered. 
A mu ch shorte r version of this paper has appeared in th e Maynooth University Record, 
:woo. 
: As Armst rong ri ghtly points out it is hard to see what there was that would have been 
ava il able to Eun apius that was not available to Porphyry : Loeb Vol. I (2nd edn.) pp. 2-3, 
I"ootnote I . 
' On this see Rist, J.M., Plotinus:The Road to Reality , p. 248 footnote 8 and th e 
references g iven there. 
• Eunapius, V. Soph . (p . 6 Boissonade). 
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We know th~ he only turned to philosophy at the age of twenty-seven. He 
then set out for Alexandria where Porphyry tells us the teachers of 
philosophy had the highest reputations. After searching and discarding 
various teach~rs he settled down under the tutorship of Ammonius Saccas 
(VP 3.llff.). If we know little about Plotinus we know a great deal less 
about Ammo11ius.5 "ein groj3er Schatten" 'a greater shadow' he was called 
in a famous phrase by W. Theiler.6 Ammonius Saccas wrote nothing and 
indeed Plotims and two other of Ammonius's pupils (Erennius and Origen) 
agreed not to reveal his philosophy even after his death. This vow was 
however evettually broken,7 which leaves us today trying to reconstruct his 
teachings from the writings of his pupils. Whatever it was that he was 
preaching it certainly caught the attention of Plotinus. Porphyry tells us that 
he: 
acquire~ so complete a training in philosophy that he became 
eager 1o make acquaintance with the Persian philosophical 
discipli11e and that prevailing among the Indians (VP 3.14-17). 
In 2428 he tcok part in the expedition of the Roman emperor Gordian III to 
the East. Go,dian III had been saluted emperor by the Praetorian Guard at 
the age of 13. The Praetorian Prefect ran the emperor's affairs and set out 
on this expedition in reply to a Persian attack the previous year. There were 
substantial s11.ccesses at first. Then Gordian was murdered in Mesopotamia 
in 244 throush the machinations of Philip the Arab. The expedition ended 
in failure and Plotinus barely escaped with his life. He made his way to 
Antioch before finally settling in Rome at the age of 40 when Philip had 
become emr:eror. 
Plotinus set Lip a school here and began teaching but at first he kept to the 
vow that te had taken regarding the teachings of Ammonius. The 
agreement \1'as then broken by one of the other pupils and while Plotinus 
still wrote nothing down he began more and more to base his lectures on his 
studies with Ammonius (VP 3.33-34). But for ten years he wrote nothing 
down. The11 in the tenth year of the reign of the emperor Gallienus 
5 See Schroeder, F., 'Ammonius Saccas' , Aufsteig und Niedergang der romischen Welt, 
pp. 493-525. 
6 
'Plotin und de antike Philosopie', Museum Helveticum, 1, p . 215. 
7 See O'Brien , D. , 'Plotinus and the Secrets of Amrnonius', pp. 117-153. 
8 All dates areA.D. 
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Porphyry arrived in Rome. Plotinus was 59 years old by this time. 
Unfortunately everything noteworthy tends to happen after the arrival of 
Porphyry, or so Porphyry himself suggests, therefore we have to read him 
very carefully. One major event however did happen before Porphyry's 
arrival; that is, Plotinus had begun in 253 to write down the material that 
came up in discussion at the schoo). By the time of Porphyry's arrival in 
263 Plotinus had completed 21 treatises. At Porphyry's urging Plotinus 
wrote another 24 treatises while Porphyry was with him. Needless to say 
Porphyry is inclined to think that this was his best work. So the total in 266 
was 45 treatises. At that point Porphyry wasn't feeling the best and took 
himself off to Sicily to recuperate. While he was in Sicily Plotinus wrote 
the final nine treatises that have come down to us as the Enneads. A total of 
54, 6 multiplied by 9, hence the title, Enneads (Nines). 
By now Plotinus was in fairly poor health. Porphyry was not present but 
was informed about the lead up to Plotinus's death by those who stayed 
with Plotinus to the end, notably Eustochius. His voice lost its cleamess, his 
sight became blurred and his hands and feet became ulcerated. He left the 
city and went to Campania to stay in the house of an old friend who had 
passed away. He died in 270. 
To some extent those are the just the bare facts concerning his life and 
death. But Porphyry does also give us a good picture of the daily life of the 
philosopher and of Plotinus as an ordinary man surrounded by friends and 
involved in the same ordinary difficulties as everyone else. He had friends 
ranging from the emperor Gallienus and his wife Salonina to the ordinary 
people with whom he lived. Presumably some of these cared little for 
philosophy. He clearly did not live the sort of life one might associate with 
a mystic. Quite surprising is the fact that, according to Porphyry, he ran a 
sort of orphanage: 
Many men and women of the highest rank, on the approach of 
death, brought him their children, both boys and girls, and 
entrusted them to him along with all their property, considering 
that he would be a holy and god-like guardian (VP 9.5-9). 
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So he looked after other people's property when it was entrusted to him and 
took care that he was accurate in such matters9 (VP 9.13-14). He was 
clearly not regarded as a philosopher who spent his time in some sort of 
mystic trance. The Aristophanic caricature of the philosopher in Clouds 
finds no place in Porphyry's Life of Plotinus. On the contrary, Plotinus 
appears to have lived a very ordinary life. He mixed with other people, 
greeting them intimately if we are to judge from Porphyry's note that when 
he developed leprosy his friends avoided him because he had the habit of 
greeting them by word of mouth (TO cmo OTOIJOTO) ... TipoaayopE\JEIV) 
(Arm. tr.)(VP 2.16-17). He took his annual summer holiday from his job as 
a philosopher when he would only converse about ordinary everyday 
matters (ayovTo) apyovs-) (VP 5.4). He was by no means an intellectual 
snob. While it would be unfair to say perhaps that he suffered fools gladly, 
he clearly accepted that people had limitations (VP 7 .7). 
The Plotinus that emerges from Porphyry's Life is thus hard to reconcile 
with the philosopher of the Enneads. In Ennead III. 2 [47] 8. 16-21 we are 
asked: 
If some boys, who have kept their bodies in good training, but 
are inferior in soul to their bodily condition because of lack of 
education , win a wrestle with others who are trained neither in 
body or soul and grab their food and their dainty clothes , would 
the affair be anything but a joke? 
Yet his own actions tell us that he clearly regarded the everyday difficulties 
of life as a serious affair for the non-philosopher. Those who had not yet 
taken or who were highly unlikely ever to take the 'upward path' he still 
protected from the day to day difficulties of ordinary life to the best of his 
ability (VP 9 .16ff.). Porphyry strengthens this view of him by telling us that 
"he was gentle" (VP 9.18) 10 and that kindliness shone out from him 
(Tj TIP<;XOTTJ) onif..a!llTE) (VP 13.8-9). He was , we are told at the "disposal 
of all who had any sort of acquaintance with him" (VP 9.19-20). 11 
~My italics. 
10 See al so VP 23.1 ff. 
11 Armstrong tr., my italics. 
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Conversely he was clearly not averse to making use of a friend if the need 
arose. The emperor Gallienus and his wife Salonina greatly respected 
Plotinus. In retum, Plotinus, in his quest to have Platonopolis established, 
tried to make full use of their friendship (VP 12.3). Here was a man who 
had a surprising degree of penetration into character (VP 11.1 ). He was 
worldly enough to notice that Porphyry had become suicidal and showed 
great common sense in advising a simple holiday as a remedy (VP 11.11 ff.). 
He was, it seems, quite active in everyday affairs and obviously sufficiently 
self-possessed to the extent that even though he managed to spend twenty-
six years in Rome and acted as an arbitrator in very many people's disputes, 
he never made an enemy of any of the officials (VP 9.20-22). 
The question is this: how do we reconcile the philosopher of the Enneads 
with the man that emerges from Porphyry's Life? To understand why this is 
a problem we need to look briefly at the content of the Enneads. In 
particular we need to understand the metaphysical structure that underpins 
the ethics and the psychology of the Enneads. 
II The Metaphysical Structure of the Enneads 
The first thing that should be made clear is that Plotinus differed greatly 
from Plato in one major respect. Plotinus was a mystic. Not only did he 
believe in a metaphysical construct designed to reveal another level of 
reality, as for example with Plato's Forms, he also believed that the 
philosopher was actually capable of making an ascent to the highest point in 
this other world. In fact Porphyry claims that Plotinus actually made such 
an ascent on four occasions: 
. .. for his end and goal was to be united to, to approach the God 
who is over all things. Four times while I was with him he 
attained that goal (VP 23.15ff.). 
At the top of Plotinus' hierarchical structure of reality is the One. The One 
is the undiminished giver from which all else comes. It produces, as all 
perfect things do, and what is produced is the world of Intellect. Intellect is 
the One in multiplicity , in multiplicity because being less perfect than the 
One it cannot retain its unity. This is the world of Plato's Forms and 
Aristotle's Nous. This is real Being; the One is beyond Being. Intellect too 
produces; the result of its production is Soul. This is a further remove from 
the unity and perfection of the One. Soul's attempt to express the 
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multiplicity of Intellect results in the sense world that we have around us. 
This sensible world is merely an imperfect copy of the Intelligible world. 
As it is a lesser level it must operate in time not eternity. This sensible 
world is the home of the body/soul compound, that is, the human being. 
The important point is however, that soul is ultimately an inhabitant of the 
Intelligible world. It stretches from there to this sensible world which it has 
created. It is a bridge between the Intelligible and Sensible world. Important 
for us to understand, in view of the theme of this paper, is the fact that we, 
as body/soul compounds have a part of our soul that belongs to the 
Intelligible world. There is a part of our soul that never descends. This 
higher soul is always available to us if we choose to become conscious on 
its level. That is what the Enneads are instructing us to do. 
There we have in a very brief and crude way Plotinus's metaphysical 
world. 12 I am well aware that I have given a fairly simple and 
uncontroversial account. What is clear though and free from dispute is the 
fact that we as human beings have our origins at a higher level and can 
return to that level if we choose. The world just described exists not only 
outside of the human being but also within us. The different metaphysical 
levels are not cut off from one another, rather the different levels of Being 
are traversed by the soul and the upward path is always at hand. We heard 
Porphyry say that Plotinus took this path four times while he was with him. 
He joined in mystical union with the One. Porphyry himself claims one 
such ascent. We can hear from Plotinus himself exactly what such an ascent 
was like: 
Often I have woken up out of the body to my self and have 
entered into myself, going out from all other things; I have seen 
a beauty wonderfully great and felt assurance that then most of 
all I belonged to the better part; I have actually lived the best life 
and come to identity with the divine; and set firm in it I have 
come to that supreme actuality, setting myself above all else in 
the realm of Intellect. Then after that rest in the divine, when I 
have come down from Intellect to discursive reasoning, I am 
12 One of the best general introductions to the metaphysics of the Enneads is still, in my 
opinion, the chapters in A.H. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy, pp. 175-
196. 
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puzzled how I ever came down, and how my soul has come to be 
in the body (Ennead IV. 8 [6] l.lff.) . 
You can see the basic Platonic idea of our souls belonging to a higher world 
but for some reason becoming ensnared in the material sphere. Why we 
come down is another matter that could be debated. But this metaphysical 
structure contains al l the essentials. We have the freedom to leave the 
sensible world if we choose. Thus the duty of the philosopher is , as it was 
for Plato, to break out of that tomb which is the body and regain our proper 
metaphysical level. This is the stated objective of the Plotinian sage. 
III The Ascent 
Since the One is within us, our efforts should tend towards an internal 
spiritual journey. The body, if not evil, is simply something that has 
attached itself to our lower soul, and so should be ignored as much as 
possible. It cannot be ignored completely: 
He must give to this bodily life as much as it needs and he can, 
but he is himself other than it and free to abandon it. . . (Ennead I. 
4 [46] 16. 17-18). 
It is clear that the focu s must be on the ascent to the Divine. This is in 
keeping with the Greek philosophical tradition to which Plotinus belonged. 
For Plato the objective was to become like God (Theaetetus 176b). Aristotle 
in the Nicomachean Ethics begins Book l by asking what is it that everyone 
strives after. The answer he arrives at is eudaimonia. This is not simply 
happiness but rather the hi ghest and best possible life for a human being. 
This consists in the contemplation of God: 
. . . but we ought so far as in us lies, to put on immortality , and to 
do all that we can to live in conformity with the hi ghes t that is in 
us ... (1 177b3lff.). 
The philosophy of the Enneads is in general agreement with these views. 
But how exactly do we accomplish this? How do we break out of the body'l 
Here Plotinus certainly goes beyond Plato. Plato advised the philosopher to 
pay as little attention to the body as possib le while impri soned in it and be 
unconcerned at having to abandon it. If he were to do that then he could sit 
with the smu gness of Socrates in the Phaedo. 
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I can't persuade Crito that I am this Socrates here who is talking to 
you now and marshalling all the arguments; he thinks that I am the 
one whom he will see presently lying dead; and he asks how he is to 
bury me'· .. No you must keep up your spirits and say that it is only my 
body that you are burying; and you can bury it as you please ... 
(Phaedo, liOd ff.). 
In Plotinus the instructions are clear. We must, Plotinus tells us, take the 
upward path. We must strive to bring back the god in us to the Div ine in the 
All. 13 We are souls who have chosen to desert the level of Intellect and live 
in the world of images that is this sense world. We are whatever conscious-
level we choose to operate on. We can choose to be beguiled by the images 
that come from the sense world thinking them to be real and so spend our 
time being concerned with the body. We have also the option of ignoring 
the images that come to us from sense objects and the freedom to choose to 
focus on the realities of Intellect itself. We are, in a wonderful phrase by 
E.R. Dodds, "a fluctu ating spotlight of consciousness." 14 
The Enneads are a handbook designed to help one make this mystical 
ascent, to help one become conscious on the level of Intellect, and there, to 
make contact with the One. This we can do. So becoming God-like is bound 
up with consciousness. How does one become conscious at the level of the 
higher soul? Plotinus tells us: 
There are two stages of the journey for all, one when they are 
going up and one when they have arrived above. The first leads 
from the regions below , the second is for those who are already 
in the intelli gible realm and have gained their foo ting There . .. 
(Ennead I. 3 [20] 1. 13ff) . 
Plotinus then in thi s treatise termed On Dialectic by Porphyry, goes on to 
describe what sorts of things the ordinary aspirant should pay attention to 
and w hat steps s/he should follow. In fact the road he describes is very 
similar to the one so beautifully described by Plato in that wonderful piece 
in the Symposium where Plato outlines the ascent to the Form of Beauty. 15 
11 VP 2.26 
14 Dodds, E.R., Les Sources de Plotin, pp. 385-386. 
15 Symposium 209e Sff. 
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Part of the background training for this is the four cardinal virtues laid out 
in the Plato's Republic: Courage, Wisdom, Temperance, and Justice? So 
what sort of a person does the sage become? 
IV Ethics: Theory and Practice 
One would assume that s/he would be quite indifferent to the matters of 
daily life. The only genuine help that the sage could give would be to tum 
those who are capable of it into philosophers and prepare them to become 
conscious on the level of real Being. One would assume from the Enneads 
that the sage would hardly bother with non-philosophers. What could s/he 
do for them? It is hard to see the sage then as a friend to all. This has indeed 
been the view of a number of scholars. 16 The most recent has been Dillon. 
He suggests with regard to the Plotinian sage: 
All earthly concems such as love for family or kin, not to 
mention care for the poor and oppressed, and all passions, such 
as pity or grief, must be shaken off (like clothes at an initiation 
ceremony) in the process of purification. 17 
He also adds: 
One feels of Plotinus that he would gladly have helped an old 
lady across the road - but he might very well fail to notice her at 
all, and if she were s~uashed by a passing wagon he would 
remain quite unmoved. 1 
This is a reasonable comment to make based on the philosophy expounded 
in the Enneads. For instance in Ennead I. 2 [19] 7. 19-27 Plotinus has this 
to say: 
Perhaps the possessor of the (civic] virtues will know them, and 
how much he can get from them, and will act according to some 
of them as circumstances require. But when he reaches higher 
principles and different measures he will act according to these . 
16 
See Plass, P., 'Plotinus' Ethical Theory', p. 253 and Westra, L., Plotinus and Freedom, 
p. 127. 
17 Dillon, J. , 'An ethic for the late antique sage', p. 320. 
IX Ibid. p. 324. 
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For instance, he will not make self control consist in that former 
observance of measure and limit, but will altogether separate 
himself, as far as possible, from his lower nature and will not live 
the life of the good man which civic virtue requires .19 He will 
leave that behind, and choose another, the life of the gods: for it 
is to them, not to good men that we are to be made like. 
The point that I want to make is that I do not see how Plotinus the 
philosopher who espouses this philosophy in the Enneads can be easily 
reconciled with Plotinus the man as he appears in Porphyry's Life. 20 The 
problem is thi s: the imperative of the Enneads is that we must try to bring 
back the god in us to the divine in the All (VP 2.26). This would, one 
imagines, demand a somewhat reclusive lifestyle for the sage. This does not 
seem to be the lifestyle that emerges from Porphyry's biography. Indeed, I 
am not the only one who has found the philosophy of the Enneads slightly 
at odds with the philosopher evoked by the pen of Porphyry. 
In 1984 Ferwerdi1 had this to say: 
But deep in our heart we cannot help remembering how 
Porphyry te11s us that Plotinus was a very nice person, a man 
who showed a great deal of concern for what happened to other 
people. Does this not indicate a certain dichotomy between 
doctrine and behaviour'! 
More recently Bussanich22 has noted: 
<Y My itali cs 
20 It is by no means easy to see why A. H. Armstron g should conclude that " .. Plotinus 
was a complete and consistent character in whom life and thought were so closely related 
that it is not easy to understand the one without knowing something about the other." The 
Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early M edieval Philosophy, p. 3. Note too the 
same uneasy compromise in the phil osophy of Epicurus. Epicureans were famous for 
their friendship but it is not easy to see why this should be so given their ethical 
~hilosophy that aimed at invulnerability. 
1 Ferwerda, R., 'Pity in the Life and Thought of Plotinus', p. 58. 
22 Bussanich , J. , 'The Invulnerability of Goodness: The Ethical and Psychological Theory 
ofPiotinus', p. 182. 
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We may conclude therefore that just as Plotinus admitted the 
beauty of the visible world, while still holding it to be an 'unreal' 
beauty, so he admitted that practical help should be given to 
one's fellow humans while at the same time supposing that the 
problems that he was helping to solve were unreal problems. 
Thus if he ever supposed that it was not the philosopher's 
concern to act in such matters, he was as good as saying that the 
lesser goods of the visible world were no goods at all. We should 
recall at this point that he is undoubtedly the victim of Plato's 
divided thoughts on these problems. Is the true philosopher the 
dualistically-minded ascetic of the Phaedo or the interested 
dissector of the marvels of the visible world of the Timaeus? 30 
Having moved back to Plato, Rist suggests that the edict of the Cave in 
Republic may be the solution. Does Plotinus recognise a duty to his fellow 
humans? Was Plotinus following the command of Plato to go back into the 
Cave? Rist dismisses this because in his view the virtues for Plotinus, at 
their highest level, are purely contemplative. We do not go back into the 
Cave out of a sense of duty. 31 Aware that the problem has still not been 
solved Rist offers a final solution. He tells us that: 
.. .in practice he [Plotinus] has recognised that concern for others 
does not entail the withdrawal of the mind from higher things 
and its submergence in the lower. The Plotinian soul is a subtle 
instrument; it can contemplate the higher and care for the lower 
at the same time.32 
Metaphysically Rist is correct here. The sage can do this but the question 
still remains: why would the sage bother with the non-philosopher? 
Bussanich too offers a solution: 
In the special case of the philosopher, virtuous actions are 
accomplished spontaneously and easily; without feelings, 
deliberation, or choice; without awareness of the particulars; and 
30 Ibid. p. 166. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. p. 168. 
32 
with complete detachment as to the outcome (!.4.10.22-34, 
IV.4.8.4ff.). 33 
This explanation can, it seems to me, be drawn very reasonably from 
Plotinus' s metaphysics but does not fully account for the picture of the sage 
delivered by Porphyry. Plotinus does not come across as an automaton, as 
someone without feelings. Although both Rist and Bussanich present 
Plotinus as someone operating on two levels, as he undoubtedly did, this 
does not, in my opinion, solve the problem. They tell us what the sage can 
do but they do not tell us why s/he would do it. We are still left with the 
question: why does the sage bother with the non-philosopher? I noted above 
that Rist had suggested that there is no answer in the Enneads to why the 
sage would bother with the non-philosopher. He may well be right. The 
philosophy of the Enneads is for specialists. The content is aimed at helping 
the philosopher achieve union with the One. It is not concerned with the 
non-philosopher34 But the Enneads also tell us that the sage has concerns 
for ordinary folk. At I. 4 [ 46] 11.13 we are told: "He would like all men to 
prosper and no one to be subject to any sort of evil" ,35 imaginary or not one 
presumes. This is certainly reflected in Plotinus' life. 
The answer to this problem may well lie in Plotinus' metaphysics. The 
creator of the sensible world, the World Soul, as Plotinus calls it, 
instinctively looks after its creation. And we are encouraged in the Enneads, 
as Smith36 points out, to act like the World Soul. If we do, Smith suggests 
that "the norms of ethical conduct flow automatically and without difficulty 
from the higher life of Intellect."37 The solution to this problem may well be 
along these lines, but the matter is, at least to me, still far from clear. 
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Plotinus seems committed to the contradictory position that the 
phi losopher will, on the one hand, be self-sufficient, free of 
constraining emotional attachments, and fully immersed in 
contemplation and, on the other hand, that she will also act 
virtuously and be friendly. 
Bussanich logically goes on to ask how the biographical details of Plotinus' 
life can be reconciled with his metaphysical psychology.23 
This was a man who looked after orphans. A man who patiently attended to 
the accounts of those who entrusted him with their property and took care 
that they should be accurate (VP 9.13ff). Porphyry says that he was gentle 
and at the disposal of all who had any sort of acquaintance with him (VP 
9.19). Clearly he was not uncaring in any normal sense of the word. How 
do we reconcile this apparent ambiguity? 
This is not a recent problem. As early as 1967 Rist had found difficulty with 
Plotinus' theory and practice. Given the metaphysics and psychology of the 
Enneads it is hard to see why the sage would bother with anyone else. Rist 
suggests that the only real help the philosopher could offer his friends is to 
demonstrate in his own life that the philosophic ascent is "possible and 
worthwhile"?4 
The theory of the self-sufficiency of the sage should preclude 
him from all communal interests ... .In theory the sage's only 
concern should be with teaching; in practice Plotinus both 
teaches those who can be taught and helps those who are not able 
to enter upon the path of philosophy so that they may avoid 
troubles which (in theory) are illusory in any case.25 
Given the metaphysics and psychology of the Enneads it is hard to see why 
the sage would bother with anyone at all. As the quote above indicates, one 
could possibly argue that the only real help a philosopher could give is to 
teach? 5 But as Ri st then observes: why bother even to teach? For Plotinus 
23 Ibid. 
24 Rist, J.M., Road to Reality, p. 163. 
25 See also Rist, J.M., 'Plotinus and Moral Obligation', pp . 217-233. 
26 Rist, J.M., Road to Reality, p. 163. 
30 
all that should matter is his own successful career of contemplation
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Rist 
says that there is no answer to this question in the Enneads and he suggests 
that we should not expect one?8 But surely we are entitled to consistency 
between a life lived and a philosophy preached? 
Rist does however offer a solution to the problem of why the sage might 
teach: 
There is a harmony in the whole of the universe. All things 
derive from the One and are, in Plotinus' language, in the One. 
All souls are striving to greater or lesser degrees to return to him. 
When any individual soul returns and is joined in communion 
with its source, it must be presumed to share in its source's 
creativity and causal energy. In other words, each soul will 
become responsible in its way for the creation and maintenance 
of all things. It will even love all things in so far as all things 
contain the principle of unity, for the One loves itself both in 
itself and in the rest of the cosmos. 
We know that the return of the soul is to be explained by the 
principle of ' like to like '. The soul is like the One, and the more 
it is purified the more it resembles the One's simplicity. Hence 
even before it achieves the union with its source which it seeks, 
it will be trying to act in a manner appropriate to the One. It will 
be sharing the One's omnipresence in so far as it can, and it will 
a! ways be turned towards others, knowing that once they turn 
towards the One.' they will be led back on the .Bath to union. 
What ht gher mottve could prompt a man to teach?-9 
This seems to me a reasonable argument as to why the sage would teach. It 
takes account of the metaphysics and psychology of the Enneads. But what 
about those who would or could not be taught? What responsibility does the 
sage have to these? None, one would imagine. Yet in practice Plotinus 
cared for these too. Rist traces this back to a fundamental problem in Plato: 
27 !bid. 
2R Ibid. 
29 Ibid. pp. 163-164. 
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